OpenClaw: WebSocket shared-auth connections could self-declare elevated scopes
Critical severity
GitHub Reviewed
Published
Mar 13, 2026
in
openclaw/openclaw
•
Updated Mar 13, 2026
Description
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database
Mar 13, 2026
Reviewed
Mar 13, 2026
Last updated
Mar 13, 2026
Summary
A logic flaw in the OpenClaw gateway WebSocket connect path allowed certain device-less shared-token or password-authenticated backend connections to keep client-declared scopes without server-side binding. A shared-authenticated client could present elevated scopes such as
operator.admineven though those scopes were not tied to a device identity or an explicitly trusted Control UI path.Impact
This crossed the intended authorization boundary and could let a shared-secret-authenticated backend client perform admin-only gateway operations.
Affected versions
openclaw<= 2026.3.11Patch
Fixed in
openclaw2026.3.12. The gateway now clears unbound scopes for non-Control-UI shared-auth connections, and regression tests cover the device-less shared-auth path.References